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I consider the problem of the optimal limit order price of a financial asset in the framework of the
maximization of the utility function of the investor. The analytical solution of the problem gives
insight on the origin of the recently empirically observed power law distribution of limit order prices.
In the framework of the model, the most likely proximate cause of this power law is a power law
heterogeneity of traders’ investment time horizons .
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last years physicists have shown a considerable
interest in the empirical investigation of statistical reg-
ularities in socioeconomic systems. The next step of
this type of investigation should be the understanding
of the origin of the discovered statistical regularities. Ul-
timately the explanation should be given by modeling the
behavior and the preferences of the agents playing in the
system. However there is often a significant mismatch
between the way of modeling how agents’ preferences are
matched and the real mechanism through which agents
take their decision and meet other agents’ preferences.
Consider for example agents in a financial market. The
theory of supply and demand describes how prices fluc-
tuates as the result of a balance between product avail-
ability at each price and the desires of buying at each
price. However in any real financial market, agents re-
frain from revealing their full supply or demand, trade
incrementally large orders, choose strategically the tim-
ing and the amount of supply or demand they put in the
market. In other words the agent’s decision making pro-
cess takes into account the specific way in which market
works. Financial markets are an optimal system to study
agents’ preferences and decision making strategies and
their effect on statistical regularities of financial time se-
ries. This is due to the large availability of detailed data
and to the relatively simple market structure. Several
papers have been published on the optimal strategy of
traders but these studies consider mainly a specific type
of trader, the dealer or liquidity provider [1, 2, 3, 4]. A
paper more related to the present one but that consider
a simplified price dynamics is Ref. [5]. The market struc-
ture of most financial markets is the limit order book
(or continuous double auction). The limit order book is
a queue where the list of buy and sell limit orders are
stored. A limit order is an order to buy or to sell a given
amount of shares at a specified price or better. If there
is no one in the market willing to sell or buy at these
conditions, the limit order is stored in the book and the
agent can wait until the price hits the limit price and the
transaction occurs. Of course the trader has the free-
dom to cancel her limit orders when she wants to. The
decision on the limit price and volume of the order is a
typical case of decision making under risk. In this paper
I consider the problem of limit order placement in the
framework of decision making.
One of the statistical regularities recently observed in
the microstructure of financial markets is the power law
distribution of limit order price in continuous double auc-
tion financial markets [6, 7]. Let b(t)−∆ denote the price
of a new buy limit order, and a(t)+∆ the price of a new
sell limit order. Here a(t) is the best ask price and b(t) is
the best sell price. The ∆ is measured at the time when
the limit order is placed. Different authors have investi-
gated the probability distribution for the quantity ∆ in
different financial markets. It is found that p(∆) is very
similar for buy and sell orders. Moreover for large values
of ∆ the probability density function is well fitted by a
single power-law
p(∆) ∼ 1
∆ζ∆
(1)
There is no consensus on the value of the exponent ζ∆.
Farmer and Zovko [6] estimated the value ζ∆ = 2.5 for
stocks traded at the London Stock Exchange, whereas
Potters and Bouchaud [7] estimated the value ζ∆ = 1.6
for stocks traded at the Paris Bourse. More recently
Mike and Farmer [8] fitted the limit order distribution
for LSE stocks with a Student’s distribution with 1.3 de-
grees corresponding to a value ζ∆ = 2.3. In their study
Farmer and Zovko studied also the correlation between
limit order placement and volatility. They found a sig-
nificant simultaneous cross correlation between volatility
and limit order placement, indicating that when volatil-
ity is high, traders tend to place limit orders with larger
values of ∆. Moreover a lagged cross correlation analysis
indicates that volatility leads relative limit price.
In this paper I investigate the origin of this power law
distribution. To achieve this goal it is important to model
the way in which traders placing limit orders decide the
limit price of their orders. Suppose that a trader wants
to place a limit order to sell. If she choose a very high
limit order price she potentially makes a large profit, but
it is unlikely that the order is matched in a reasonable
time. On the other hand if the limit order price is close to
the actual best available sell limit price, the limit order
is likely to be matched in a short time but the profit
2is small. The right limit order price is the result of a
tradeoff between these two choices and it depends on the
characteristics of the agent as well as of the market state.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II I in-
troduce the problem of limit order placement and the
modeling of the decision making process. I also find the
solution to the problem in some specific but important
cases. In Section III I use the result of the optimization
to investigate the origin of power law tail in the limit
order price distribution. In Section IV I perform an em-
pirical investigation to test the results of the model and
Section V concludes.
II. THE UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM
Expected utility is probably the most important theory
of decision making under risk [9]. An individual is faced
with a prospect (or lottery) (x1, P1; ...;xn, Pn) which is
a contract that yields outcome xi with probability Pi,
where
∑n
i=1 Pi = 1. Expected utility theory states the
existence of an utility function u(x) and the expected
utility of the prospect is
U(x1, P1; ...;xn, Pn) =
n∑
i=1
Piu(xi). (2)
When confronted with more prospects, the individual
chooses the one which maximizes the expected utility U .
Different individuals may have different utility functions
u(x). Usually the function u(x) is concave, i.e. u′′ < 0
which implies risk aversion. A very common utility func-
tion is the constant relative risk aversion utility function
u(x) = C xα (3)
In this equation α measures the level of risk aversion,
which is larger for smaller α. The value α = 1 describes
a risk neutral individual, i.e. an individual for which
expected utility is proportional to expected value of the
lottery
∑
Pixi. In this paper I make use of the utility
function of Eq. (3). However the results of the papers
remain valid also for other (but not all) forms of the
utility function. In Section V I comment on this point
while in the Appendix I consider the case of a logarithmic
utility function, u(x) = C log(1 + cx).
Consider the limit order placement as a problem of util-
ity maximization. On one hand traders would prefer to
place limit orders very far from the spread (i.e. with large
values of ∆) because this will increase trader’s profit. On
the other hand the larger the ∆ the longer (on average)
the time one has to wait until the limit order is fulfilled.
So the trader has to find the right tradeoff between these
two opposite choices. The right place where to place the
limit order depends in general from three characteristics
of the trader. First of all the optimal ∆ depends on the
patience of the trader. To model this aspect we introduce
the time horizon T of the trader, which is here defined as
the time the trader is willing to maintain the limit order
in the book before canceling it (if not matched). The sec-
ond characteristic is the volatility σ used by the trader to
model price dynamics. When the volatility is high, price
fluctuates more and the trader places limit orders with
larger values of ∆. Finally the third characteristic is the
utility function u(x) of the trader. All else being equal,
more risk averse traders place limit orders closer to the
best price.
The limit order placement problem can be formalized
as follows. Given an time horizon T , an utility func-
tion u(x), a volatility σ, and a limit order price ∆,
the prospects facing the investor is (∆, P (∆, T, σ); 0, 1−
P (∆, T, σ)), i.e. she gains ∆ with probability P (∆, T, σ)
if the limit order is matched in a trade in a time shorter
than T or she gains 0 with probability 1 − P (∆, T, σ) if
the limit order is canceled before the price reaches the
limit order price. The trader’s utility is
UT,σ(∆) = P (∆, T, σ) u(∆)+ (1− P (∆, T, σ)) u(0) (4)
Without loss of generality we can set u(0) = 0
because the expected utility can be rewritten as
P (∆, T, σ)(u(∆)− u(0)) + u(0) and the value of ∆ max-
imizing the utility u is the same as the value maxi-
mizing u − u(0). Thus to each limit order price it
is associated a lottery with a different expected utility
UT,σ(∆) = P (∆, T, σ) u(∆) and the trader maximizes
her utility by choosing the lottery with the largest ex-
pected utility. In other words trader maximizing utility
places limit orders at the value of ∆ which maximizes
UT,σ(∆), i.e. ∆
∗ ≡ argmax[UT,σ(∆)].
In order to explicit the functional form of UT,σ(∆) we
need to find the expression for P (∆, T, σ) which is the
probability that the price random walk reaches the level
∆ between t = 0 when the limit order is placed and
t = T when the limit order is canceled. This probability
is related with the first passage time distribution, which
is the probability that a stochastic process reaches a given
level x for the first time at time t. Assuming that price
performs a Brownian motion with diffusion rate σ, the
first passage distribution is (see for example [10])
f(∆, t) =
∆√
2piσ2t3
exp[− ∆
2
2σ2t
] (5)
Thus the probability that the limit order is fulfilled in
the interval 0 ≤ t ≤ T is
P (∆, T, σ) =
∫ T
0
f(∆, t) dt = erfc
[
∆√
2σ2T
]
(6)
Let us assume that trader has a constant relative risk
aversion utility function with exponent α , then the func-
tion to be maximized is
UT,σ(∆) = erfc
[
∆√
2σ2T
]
C∆α (7)
Figure 1 shows the dependence of UT,σ(∆) from the pa-
rameters.
3FIG. 1: Expected utility UT,σ(∆) of Eq. (7) as a function
of the distance ∆ of the limit price from the corresponding
best. The panels show the dependence of UT,σ(∆) from the
time horizon T (top), the volatility σ (middle), and utility
function parameter α (bottom).
The maximization of UT,σ(∆) is obtained by deriva-
tion with respect to ∆. The maximum cannot be found
analytically, but a simple scaling argument helps in un-
derstanding the solution. The equation ∂∆U = 0 can be
rewritten as
C∆α−1
[
α erfc[z]− 2√
pi
ze−z
2
]
= 0 (8)
where I have set z = ∆/
√
2σ2T . The solution of the
equation obtained by putting to zero the term in square
bracket can be obtained formally by solving the equation
in α
α =
2√
pi
z e−z
2
erfc[z]
≡ g(z) (9)
which gives z = g−1(α) and with this position one obtains
for ∆ the optimal value
∆∗ =
√
2g−1(α)σT 1/2 (10)
This is the solution to the utility maximization problem
and the rational trader should put the limit order at a
distance ∆∗ from the corresponding best price. Eq. (10)
holds for power law utility functions. In the appendix I
show that logarithmic utility function leads to the rela-
tion ∆∗ ∼ T 1/2/ logT , i.e. there is a logarithmic correc-
tion to the square root relation.
III. ON THE ORIGIN OF POWER LAW
DISTRIBUTION OF LIMIT ORDER PRICES
In the framework of the utility maximization model
described above, an homogeneous set of traders charac-
terized by the same utility function (exponent α), the
same time horizon T and the same volatility estimation
σ would place limit order always at the same distance
∆∗ of Eq. 10 from the best. This is at odds with what
observed in real data, since, as we have discussed above,
empirical investigations show that the limit order price
distribution is very broad and probably compatible with
a power law with a small exponent. We can then ask
what is the origin of power law distribution of limit or-
der prices according to our model.
Since the optimal distance ∆∗ of Eq. (10) depends on
T , α, and σ, an heterogeneity in one of these three pa-
rameters would result in a distribution of ∆ with a non-
vanishing variance. I want to explore the possible role of
the three parameters in being the most likely proximate
cause of power law distribution of limit order prices. In
real markets one expects an heterogeneity in all the three
parameters, thus all contribute in principle to the distri-
bution of limit price. I will consider the three cases in
which two of the parameters are fixed and the third one
is allowed to vary according to some distribution in order
to see the separate effect of each parameter on the limit
price distribution. In the Conclusions I argue that this
way of proceeding is not a limitation.
4Heterogeneity in time horizon. First of all let us con-
sider the role of the heterogeneity of time horizon T . We
assume that traders are characterized by a probability
density function PT (T ) of time horizon and that they
are homogenous with respect to the utility function and
to the volatility. From eq. (10) the distribution of limit
order price is then given by
P∆(∆) = PT (T )
∣∣∣∣ dTd∆
∣∣∣∣ ∝ PT (T )∆ (11)
The only way to have a power law distribution of limit
order price like in Eq. (1) is then to assume that the
distribution of time horizon is asymptotically power law
PT (T ) ∼ T−ζT . In this case the limit order price are
power law distributed with an exponent
ζ∆ = 2ζT − 1 (12)
Under these assumptions the power law distribution of
limit order prices is the consequence of the power law
distribution of time horizon. By using the empirical
values for ζ∆ we can infer the value of ζT . The value
ζ∆ = 2.5 obtained by Zovko and Farmer [6] gives the
value ζT = 1.75, whereas the value ζ∆ = 1.6 obtained
by Potters and Bouchaud [7] gives the value ζT = 1.3.
It is very difficult to measure empirically the statisti-
cal properties of time horizon. However a recent paper
by Borland and Bouchaud [11] introduces a GARCH-like
model obtained by introducing a distribution of traders’
time horizons and the model reproduces empirical values
of volatility correlation for ζT = 1.15, significantly close
to our estimate. In an unpublished work by Vaglica et
al. [12] an estimate of the time horizon distribution is ob-
tained for the Spanish Stock Exchange by computing the
time a given institution is (statistically) maintaining its
buy or sell position. The empirical distribution of time
horizon is power law with an exponent ζT ≃ 2.5. In con-
clusion recent empirical results indicate the presence of a
power law distribution of investment time horizons. The
estimated value of tail exponent supports the view of the
heterogeneity of time horizon as the proximate cause for
fat tails in limit order prices.
In order to check whether the result of Eq. 12 is valid
only for power law utility function I consider also a log-
arithmic utility function u(x) = C log(1 + cx). In the
appendix I show that in this case
P∆(∆) ∼ 1
∆2ζT−1 (log∆)2ζT−2
(13)
i.e., a part from a logarithmic correction, the limit or-
der price distribution is still asymptotically power law
with the same exponent as for power law utility func-
tion (Eq. 12). The logarithm as well as its powers are
slowly varying functions [13]. In Extreme Value Theory
the presence of slowly varying functions is unessential to
the description to the asymptotic behavior of a function.
More precisely all the functions xαL(x), where L(x) is
any slowly varying function, belong to same Maximum
Domain of Attraction. As a consequence statistical esti-
mators of the tail exponent which are based on Extreme
Value Theory (for example the Hill estimator) give the
same exponent α independently on L(x). In other words
the presence of the logarithmic correction is invisible to
many tail exponent estimators. This means that utility
functions different from Eq. (3) may give the same scaling
exponent ζ∆.
Heterogeneity in utility. The second hypothesis we
want to test is whether power law distributed limit order
prices can be explained by only assuming heterogeneity
in utility function (i.e. in α), assuming that T and σ are
constant. Assuming a probability density function for α,
Pα(α) and by using Eqs. (9) and (10), one can derive the
formula for the distribution of limit order price
P∆(∆) = Pα(α)
1√
2σ2T
(14)
×
[
4e−2z
2
z
pierfc2(z)
+
2e−z
2
√
pierfc(z)
− 4e
−z2z2√
pierfc(z)
]
where as before z = ∆/
√
2σ2T . Since g(z) of eq. 9 is
a convex monotonically increasing function of z, large
values of ∆ are explained by large values of α. The dis-
tribution of limit price is determined by Pα(α) and in
particular from its support. If for example the traders
are risk averse, α < 1 and also the support of P∆(∆) is
bounded, meaning that there is a maximal value of ∆ be-
yond which traders do not place limit orders. However it
is possible to find a specific, yet quite artificial, distribu-
tion of the parameter α giving a power law distribution
of limit order prices. Not surprisingly the utility distri-
bution is power law, i.e. Pα(α) ∼ α−ζα in some interval
of the exponent α governing the utility function of the
traders. By expanding Eq. (14) for large z (i.e. large ∆)
I show that the asymptotic behavior of limit price distri-
bution is P∆(∆) ∼ ∆−ζ∆ with ζ∆ = 2ζα − 1. In order
to match the empirical value for ζ∆ obtained by Zovko
and Farmer one has to postulate a power law distribu-
tion of the parameter α with an exponent ζα = 1.75,
whereas the Potters and Bouchaud value gives ζα = 0.8.
Note that this last value is smaller than one implying
that the support of Pα(α) must be bounded from above.
In conclusion the model is able to deduce the power law
distribution of limit order price, but one needs to assume
the presence of many investors with very large values of
α, i.e. unrealistically risk lover.
Heterogeneity in volatility. We now want to test the
last hypothesis that changing volatility could be the prox-
imate cause of power law in limit order price distribution.
Volatility can be heterogeneous either because traders
have different estimate of volatility or because volatility
itself is fluctuating. We consider here this second pos-
sibility. In this case, even if all the traders make the
same estimate of volatility at a given time, the uncondi-
tional distribution of limit order price is broad because
of the fluctuation of volatility. We have quoted above
that Zovko and Farmer have observed a positive correla-
5tion between volatility and limit price. This correlation
is captured by the solution of Eq. (10). The point here is
to check whether fluctuation in volatility could be able to
determine a power law distribution of limit order prices.
Since volatility σ and optimal limit price ∆∗ are pro-
portional in Eq. (10), in the framework of the proposed
model the distribution of limit order price is the same
as the distribution of volatility. This means that limit
prices are power law distributed if volatility is power law
distributed as Pσ(σ) ∼ σ−ζσ . In this case ζ∆ = ζσ. In
order to match empirical values for ζ∆ we should expect
an exponent ζσ = 2.5 to explain Zovko and Farmer value
and ζσ = 1.5 to explain Potters and Bouchaud value.
Many recent measurement of volatility distribution find
a power law tail, but the fitted exponent is too large
when compared to these values. For example Liu et al.
[14] found a tail exponent ζσ slightly dependent on the
time interval used to compute volatility and ranging be-
tween 4.06 to 4.38. Micciche` et al. [15] fitted a different
proxy of volatility finding an exponent 6.27. Finally the
fit reported in the book by Bouchaud and Potters [16]
gives an estimate ζσ = 7.43. Although the proxy used
to estimate volatility can influence significantly the fit-
ted value of ζσ, it is quite clear that the empirical values
are not consistent with the value needed to explain limit
order price distribution.
In conclusion, in the framework of the present model
heterogeneity in time horizon T appears to be the most
likely explanation of power law distribution of limit order
prices.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
It is quite difficult to assess empirically which of the
variables T , σ and α (or the utility function) is determi-
nant in explaining the fat tails of limit order price dis-
tribution. This is due to the fact that T and α are un-
observable variables and volatility σ can be measured in
many different ways. Hence the purpose of the present
empirical analysis is to convince qualitatively that the
explanation given above of the power law distribution of
limit order prices is plausible. I investigate this problem
by considering the data of the London Stock Exchange
(LSE) in the period May 2000 - December 2002.
In order to assess the role of volatility fluctuations,
in top panel of Figure 2 I compare the unconditional
distribution of ∆ with the limit order price distribution
conditional to the volatility in the day when the limit
order was placed. I divide the 675 days of the sample in
five quintiles according to the volatility value and then
I plot the limit price distribution for the different quin-
tiles. It is seen that P (∆|σ) is weakly dependent on σ
strengthening the conclusion that volatility fluctuations
are unable to explain power law distribution of limit or-
der prices. This conclusion is also supported by a direct
measurement of ζ∆ by using the Hill’s estimator [13]. The
value obtained for the five subsets ranked in increasing
volatility are ζ∆ = 1.46 ± 0.07, 1.50 ± 0.07, 1.51 ± 0.07,
1.59 ± 0.07, and 1.42 ± 0.05. Finally it is worth noting
that I obtain the same weak dependence of P (∆) when
the conditioning is made on the mean volatility in the five
previous days rather than on the volatility in the same
day when the limit order was placed.
As said above, testing for a dependence of limit order
placement from the agents is very difficult due to lack
of data. However the LSE database allows us to track
the actions of individual institutions through a numer-
ical code which identifies the institution. For privacy
reasons the code is different for different stocks and it
is reshuffled each calendar month. Therefore our analy-
sis will be limited to a single trading month. I consider
as a case study the stock Astrazeneca in October 2002
(1.1 105 limit orders). There are 104 active institutions
for the considered month but the activity distribution is
quite skewed. In fact the 10 most active institutions are
responsible for more than 80% of limit orders. Bottom
panel of Figure 2 shows the limit order price distribution
for the 10 most active institutions. The figure shows that
there is a large variation of the form of the distribution
suggesting that the large heterogeneity in institution’s
limit order strategy could be the driving factor of power
law limit order price distribution. It is worth pointing out
that this empirical analysis cannot distinguish whether
the heterogeneity among different institutions is due to
an heterogeneity in time horizon T or in the utility func-
tion. However the argument above indicates that het-
erogeneity in utility function should play a minor role.
In conclusion the comparison of the two panels of Fig. 2
indicates that heterogeneity in traders’ behavior is much
more important than fluctuation in volatility in explain-
ing limit order price distribution.
V. CONCLUSIONS
I have shown that treating the limit order placement
as an utility maximization problem gives insight on the
origin of the power law distribution of limit order prices.
The main conclusion is that the heterogeneity in time
horizon is the proximate cause of this power law. Em-
pirical analysis suggests that this could be the correct
explanation. One could naively expect that all the three
parameters T , α and σ can simultaneously contribute to
the fat tailed distribution of limit order price. However
power law distributions satisfy nice aggregation proper-
ties (see, for example, [17]). If a variable y is the product
of n independent asymptotically power law distributed
variables with different tail exponents, y =
∏
i xi, then y
is asymptotically power law distributed with a tail expo-
nent equal to the minimum tail exponent of the variables
xi. This argument shows that even if all the variables
contribute to the distribution of ∆, only one determines
its tail exponent and our discussion above indicates that
the most likely candidate is the time horizon T .
The conclusion I draw on the origin of the fat tail of
6FIG. 2: Top. Cumulative distribution of sell limit order price
(in pence) for Astrazeneca traded at LSE in the period May
2000- December 2002. The black dashed line is the uncondi-
tional distribution whereas the solid lines are the distribution
of limit order price conditional to the volatility in the day
when the order was placed. The trading days are divided
in five quintiles according to the volatility value. Bottom.
Cumulative distribution of sell limit order price (in pence)
for the 10 most active institutions placing limit orders in the
stock Astrazeneca during October 2002. The number in the
legend is the institution code in the LSE database. Blue cir-
cles describe the cumulative distribution for the pool of the
10 most active institutions, whereas red squares describe the
cumulative distribution for the pool of all the 104 institutions.
limit order price distribution is based on the choice of the
utility function. In this paper I consider power law and
logarithmic utility function showing that in both cases
heterogeneity in time horizon seems to be the key vari-
able. This conclusion may not be true for other utility
functions. For example the exponential utility function
u(x) ∝ (1 − exp(−ax)) seems to behave in a different
way. The optimal limit order price cannot be found ana-
lytically, but numerical analysis suggests that in this case
∆∗ ∝ log(T ) rather than √T . As a consequence the time
horizon argument leads to P∆(∆) ∝ exp(−(ζT − 1)∆)
rather than a power law distribution. The reason for this
behavior is the extreme risk aversion of an investor with
an exponential utility function which forces the investors
to place limit orders very close to the best price, even
when the investor has a very long time horizon.
Finally, in this paper we have considered limit orders
placed inside the book, i.e. sell (buy) limit orders with a
price higher (lower) than the ask (bid). In other words
we considered only positive ∆. Recent empirical analysis
[8, 18] shows that also prices of limit orders placed inside
the spread (∆ < 0) are power law distributed with an
exponent close to the one for ∆ > 0. One is tempted
to extend the utility maximization argument to describe
limit orders inside the spread. However limit orders in
the spread are usually placed by agents with a very dif-
ferent strategy with respect to traders placing orders for
large positive ∆. Other risk factors, such as adverse se-
lection, enter in the decision process. Even if the util-
ity maximization approach can be useful in tackling this
problem, the case ∆ < 0 is outside of the scope of the
present paper and will be considered elsewhere.
I acknowledge support from the research project MIUR
449/97 “High frequency dynamics in financial markets”
and from the European Union STREP project n. 012911
“Human behavior through dynamics of complex social
networks: an interdisciplinary approach.”. I wish to
thank Doyne Farmer for providing the LSE data with
the identity code for the institutions and for useful dis-
cussions. I also thanks Rosario Mantegna and Michele
Tumminello for useful discussions.
VI. APPENDIX: LOGARITHMIC UTILITY
FUNCTION
We consider here the case of a logarithmic utility func-
tion u(x) = C log(1 + cx). The expected utility is
UT,σ(∆) = erfc
[
∆√
2σ2T
]
C log(1 + c∆) (15)
By setting to zero the derivative UT,σ(∆) with respect to
∆ and considering large ∆, one obtains
h(z) ≃ c
√
2σ2T (16)
where z = ∆/
√
2σ2T and
h(z) ≡
exp
[√
pi
2
ez
2
erfc(z)
z
]
z
(17)
Thus the optimal limit order price is
∆∗ =
√
2σT 1/2h−1(c
√
2σ2T ) (18)
7As for the power utility function the optimal limit price
∆∗ is expressed implicitly in terms of an inverse function.
The main difference with Eq. (10) is that the argument of
h−1 now contains the variables T and σ and it is not im-
mediately obvious what is the asymptotic behavior of ∆∗
for large T . In order to answer this last question we need
to study the asymptotic behavior of h−1. The function
h(z) diverges in z = 0 and is monotonically decreasing.
Thus the asymptotic behavior of h−1 is determined by
the behavior of h(z) around z = 0 which is
h(z) ≃ 1
e
exp
[√
pi
2z
]
z
(19)
We prove that h−1(x) ∼ 1/ log(x). In fact
lim
x→∞
log(x)h−1(x) = lim
z→0
log(h(z))z (20)
≃ lim
z→0
log(
1
e
exp
[√
pi
2z
]
z
)z =
√
pi
2
(21)
This result can be used to determine the asymptotic be-
havior of ∆∗. From Eq. 18 we get
∆∗ ∼ 2
√
2√
pi
σT 1/2
log(c
√
2σT 1/2)
∼ T
1/2
logT
(22)
In conclusion the optimal limit price for a logarithmic
utility function scales with T in the same way as for the
power utility function, except for a logarithmic correc-
tion.
Finally we consider what is the distribution of limit
order price ∆ under the assumption of logarithmic utility
and of power law distribution of time horizon, PT (T ) ∼
T−ζT . We know that P∆(∆) = PT (T )
dT
d∆ . Since ∆ ∼√
T/ logT , it is dT/d∆ = (d∆/dT )−1 ∼ √T logT . Thus
implicitly
P∆(∆) ∼
√
T logT
T ζT
(23)
It can be shown that
P∆(∆) ∼ 1
∆2ζT−1 (log∆)2ζT−2
(24)
In order to prove this result we consider the limit of
∆2ζT−1 (log∆)2ζT−2P∆(∆) for ∆ → ∞ and we perform
the limit by transforming it in a limit T →∞. We show
that this limit is a finite non-vanishing constant, proving
Eq. (24).
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